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ABSTRACT
Cultural impacts in planning increasingly receive attention from both
academics and practitioners around Europe. However, comparative
planning cultures studies face the challenges of lacking systematic
comparison and empirical evidence, especially at the micro level of
planning actors’ behaviour in interaction. This article aims to ﬁll
these gaps by (1) operationalizing the concept of planning culture;
and (2) measuring and comparing it. We base our operationalization
on the culturized planning model (Knieling, J., & Othengrafen,
F. (Eds.). (2009). Planning cultures in Europe: Decoding cultural
phenomena in urban and regional planning. Farnham: Ashgate).
We complement its explanatory power by building a link between
planning culture and planning outcome through attitudes of
planning actors. This article focuses on three attitudes: risk, trust and
co-operation. To measure and compare these attitudes, we adopt
three experimental economic games and conduct an experiment
with public and private planning practitioners in three European
countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. Both cross-country
and public-private diﬀerences in these attitudes are tested in the
experiment. Our experimental ﬁndings suggest that Dutch planning
actors value risk aversion and trust; Norwegian planning actors
value cooperation; while (French-speaking) Belgian planning actors
do not value these variables that much.
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1. Introduction
Urban development can be considered as the result of the interplay between spatial plan-
ning and land and property markets. One might argue that spatial planning deﬁnes to a
large extent the institutional conditions (or restrictions) for investments in land and prop-
erty development. Within this institutional context and inﬂuenced by market conditions
(demand for real estate; investment climate), both public and private actors operate. They
decide whether to invest in urban extensions, urban transformations or renovations or
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perhaps to delay intended investment projects, to make use of certain policies, instruments
and governance modes, to co-operate with other stakeholders, and to buy or sell land and
properties, etc. In diﬀerent countries and at diﬀerent times, the institutional contexts and
market conditions explain diﬀerences in outcomes of urban development processes to a
large extent. However, though regulatory planning frameworks and market conditions
have a substantial impact on stakeholder decisions, they cannot explain all diﬀerences
in outcomes. Planning systems usually leave quite some room to manoeuvre for both
public and private stakeholders to decide how to act, while market conditions can be inter-
preted in diﬀerent ways. Therefore roles and positions of public and private stakeholders
diﬀer between planning systems. In this paper we argue that how roles are fulﬁlled and
discretion is exercised is shaped not only by the individual actor, but also by (diﬀerences
in) planning culture.
Planning scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognized that culture matters.
Cultural inﬂuences in planning and urban development processes mainly manifest in two
aspects. First, the concept of planning culture is found useful in explaining the diﬀerences
in planning practice between countries (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2009; Sanyal, 2005;
Stead, De Vries, & Tasan-Kok, 2015). Second, when we consider possibilities of policy
transfer, we must pay attention to the cultural embeddedness of the transferred policies
(Stead, 2012). Several scholars have argued that formal institutional change does not
necessarily lead to the expected change in planning actors’ behaviour as cultural factors
(for instance norms, intentions, traditions, etc.) are resistant to change (Buitelaar, Galle,
& Sorel, 2011; Evers, 2015; Root, Van Der Krabben, & Spit, 2015).
Planning culture is a relatively new subject in planning literature (De Olde, 2015).
Several scholars reﬂect on the current debate on planning culture and comparative plan-
ning by stating that this debate is still characterized by conceptual fuzziness (Booth, 2011;
De Vries, 2015). Although several studies have broadened our understandings of planning
culture’s richness as well as complexity (see e.g. CULTPLAN, 2007; Keller, Koch, & Selle,
1996), the analytical power of planning culture comparison has been lacking. For Taylor
(2013), the deﬁnition of planning culture is unsettled and left to interpretations by each
researcher. This leads to a lack of conceptual precision, and makes systematic comparative
research diﬃcult (Buitelaar & Bregman, 2016). Fürst (2009) points out the methodological
deﬁciency in comparative planning culture research, these being: the analysis of expert dis-
courses; participating observations and expert experiences; and, dominantly, case studies.
Although case studies provide rich materials for discussion, the operationalization and
focus are still lacking (Buitelaar & Bregman, 2016). In addition, in terms of operationali-
zation and focus, several authors have stressed the importance of studying planning actors
and their interaction in planning decisions at the micro level (Ernste, 2012; Getimis, 2012;
Othengrafen, 2014; Reimer & Blotevogel, 2012).
In this study, we aim at making planning cultures measurable and comparable. More
speciﬁcally, we investigate how the concept of planning culture can be operationalized
in order to develop a methodology to measure and compare planning cultures.1 This
attempt is inspired by Hofstede’s work on comparative culture studies (1980, 2001) in
which he operationalizes culture as a set of values and then compares values across
diﬀerent organizations and countries. In addition, economists have empirically studied
the relationship between culture and economic outcomes through values and attitudes
(Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006) and developed experiments
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to capture cultural inﬂuences (Chuah, Hoﬀmann, Jones, & Williams, 2009; Henrich et al.,
2001). Therefore, we adopt an operational deﬁnition of planning culture as a set of values
and attitudes shared by planning actors that is learned and sustained through the planning
process. As argued by Stead et al. (2015), some of the attitudes underlying the planning
systems and the attitudes of the actors involved (e.g. preferences for individualism or col-
lectivism) diﬀer substantially. By planning actors, we mean planners working for public
authorities as well as professionals active in property development.2 Building on existing
theoretical models – in particular, the culturized planning model (Knieling & Othengra-
fen, 2009, 2015) – we conduct game experiments derived from behavioural economics to
observe values and attitudes of planning actors as operational indicators of planning
culture. Compared to traditional comparative studies on values and attitudes using
surveys, experiments are good at avoiding self-reporting biases. To test this approach,
we chose three attitudes that are critical to decision-making in planning implementation:
risk preferences, trust and propensity for co-operation. For comparative purposes, the
three attitudes were measured in three European countries: Belgium (more precisely
French-speaking Belgium), the Netherlands and Norway.3 Many comparative and
country-speciﬁc studies of land and property development in these three countries have
stressed the importance of attitudes towards risks (e.g. Halleux, Marcinczak, & Van der
Krabben, 2012; Valtonen, Falkenbach, & van der Krabben, 2017), trust (e.g. CULTPLAN,
2007; Höppner, 2009; Kadefors, 2004; Swain & Tait, 2007) and co-operation (e.g. Boxmeer
& Beckhoven, 2005; Dethier & Halleux, 2014; Falleth & Nordahl, 2017; Halleux et al., 2012;
Mäntysalo & Saglie, 2010; Nordahl, 2006; Van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013; Verhage, 2002;
Woestenburg, Van der Krabben, & Spit, 2018) in explaining outcomes of land and prop-
erty development. Furthermore, decision-making in urban (re)development has become
increasingly complex, which makes co-operation among stakeholders more or less the
rule. Given that risk and trust attitudes have been found inﬂuential in co-operative behav-
iour in economics, understanding public and private planning professionals’ risk, trust and
co-operative attitudes thus becomes more relevant.
The remaining of the article consists of ﬁve sections. Section 2 presents the conceptual
framework as a basis for the operationalization of the concept of planning culture, fol-
lowed by a description of our experimental methods (section 3). The Results and Discus-
sion sections present our empirical ﬁndings and deliberate the validity of our
methodology, as well as the successes and limitations in operationalization (section 4
and 5, respectively). Section 6 concludes and points out future research questions.
2. A conceptual framework for planning culture operationalization
2.1 The culturized planning model (CPM) as a basis
In an attempt to address the challenges to theorize the concept of planning culture, Kniel-
ing and Othengrafen (2009) propose the culturized planning model (CPM) that oﬀers a
systematic conceptual framework in comparative planning culture studies. Their model
analyzes planning culture at three levels according to ‘the degree to which the cultural
phenomenon is visible to the observer’ (Schein, 2004): planning artefacts, planning
environment and societal environment (Table 1). The three levels interact. On the one
hand, visible planning artefacts (e.g. urban development patterns) are a result of the
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decisions made by value-holding actors in the planning environment, whose values are
constantly inﬂuenced by more general values shared in the societal environment (Othen-
grafen, 2014). On the other hand, physical changes in the planning artefacts can also
mould the perceptions of planning actors, which may aﬀect general social norms (e.g.
the deterioration of urban areas may lead to greater appreciation for change in planning
policies among planning community and the society).
This model helps to ﬁll in the analytical deﬁciency in comparative planning culture
studies as it provides a systematic way to decompose cultural manifestations in planning
at three interrelated levels. However, it is not immune to criticism and it is by no means
the end of the story on the operationalization of the concept of planning culture. Getimis
(2012) and De Olde (2015) argue for instance that CPM might be intellectually attractive
but lacks explanatory power due to its abstract presentation. Moreover, important issues
remain unaddressed with the model. For instance, in what way and to what extent do
factors in societal environment inﬂuence elements in planning environment? And, to
what extent are changes in planning artefacts attributable to changes in planning environ-
ment? Answers to these questions will help disentangle the complex relationship between
culture and planning. However, the merit of this model as an analytical tool is also
obvious: it simpliﬁes the research work around the encompassing and complex concept
of planning culture by separating the demanding eﬀort for operationalization to
diﬀerent levels. It provides us with a good basis on which to position our focus of
measurement.
Among the three levels of analysis of planning culture’s manifestitations, the planning
environment in the middle can be considered as the key and the connecting layer. At this
level, actors involved in planning absorb the underlying societal beliefs (input) and make
the choices of policy responses and instruments (output, as well as planning outcome).
However, the transformation from its input to output remains as a ‘black box’. Given
the central role of planning actors in the planning environment, we believe it is justiﬁable
to focus our measurement of planning culture at this level of cultural manifestation.
2.2 Inside planning environment: values, attitudes and behaviours
In order to operationalize planning culture within the planning environment, we propose
to build a link between its input and output through values-attitudes-behaviours relations
(Figure 1), taken from relevant studies in economics and psychology. According to
Table 1. The culturized planning model (CPM) with its origins and elaborations.
The levels of
culture
Organizational Culture
(Schein, 2004)
Planning Culture (Knieling &
Othengrafen, 2009) Explanations (Stead et al., 2015)
Manifest Artefacts Planning artefacts Physical urban developments;
The organization of the planning
process;
The scope of planning
Manifest and
non-manifest
Exposed beliefs and
values
Planning environment The core values, principles and conception
of planning;
The type of actors who have access to
the planning process
Non-manifest Underlying values and
assumptions
Societal environment More general, underlying norms, beliefs
and perceptions of a particular society
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Rokeach (1973, p. 5), values can be deﬁned as ‘an enduring belief that a speciﬁc mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or con-
verse mode of conduct or end-state of existence’. Values, on the one hand, ‘are a result of
all the cultural, institutional, and personal forces that act upon a person throughout his
lifetime’ (ibid, p. 23); on the other hand, values are determinants and predictors of atti-
tudes as well as behaviour (ibid, p. 18; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999). Note that values
should not be confused with attitudes. Compared to values, attitudes are used to describe
individuals’ evaluations of more speciﬁc entity (Rohan, 2000). Meanwhile actual values are
invisible until they become evident in behaviour (Hofstede, 2001, p. 10).
Economists have argued that culture (using for instance religion and ethnicity as instru-
mental variables) impacts economic outcomes (for instance national savings rates) through
values of individuals (such as preferences for thriftiness) (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; De Jong,
2013; Guiso et al., 2006). It draws our interests in exploring whether there could be a similar
connection between planning culture (deﬁned as a set of values and attitudes of planning
actors) and planning outcome (deﬁned as choices of policy responses and instruments
made by planning actors) through the values of planning actors.
This connection consists of two parts. First of all, cultural diﬀerences manifest in the
diﬀerent values of planning actors. As argued by Healey (1998), diﬀerent stakeholders
who come from diﬀerent worlds hold diﬀerent values and stakeholders’ interactions are
Figure 1. The CPM-based framework that adds values, attitudes and behaviours within the planning
environment.
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sensitive to cultural diﬀerences. Evidence is given by Read and Leland (2011) who show
that American planners employed in the public and private sectors have diﬀerent
values towards competing interests in the planning process. Besides, cross-nationally,
public planners are also found to have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent values relevant to planners’
roles (Rodriguez & Brown, 2014). Though comparative evidence is limited, previous
studies tend to emphasize both the value diﬀerences of planning actors between countries
as well as between public and private sectors. Therefore in this study we explore both
cross-country and public-private diﬀerences in planning culture.
Second, the relationship between values of planning actors and planning outcome is
complicated. Although Reimer and Blotevogel (2012) perceive planning culture as a
speciﬁc context in which ‘the values and perceptive patterns of actors come together to
inﬂuence actions’, there is a lack of empirical evidence in planning literature to support
this statement at both the macro and micro level. With respect to empirical evidence, psy-
chologists pioneer in studying the complicated relationship between values and behaviour
(see for instance Sagiv, Roccas, Cieciuch, & Schwartz, 2017). Behavioural economists build
on insights from psychology to study actual behaviour of individuals and its determinants
within the context of single- and multi-player games in controlled experiments. Values
and attitudes are found to be explanatory variables of behaviour in experimental games
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2011).
Therefore, in our conceptual framework, the input and output of planning environ-
ment are connected: Planning actors absorb the underlying societal beliefs (input) and
form their core values accordingly. These core values aﬀect their attitudes and decision-
making behaviours in interactions. Eventually, actors’ interactions in diﬀerent places, at
diﬀerent regulatory levels and even in diﬀerent periods jointly determine the choices of
policy responses and instruments (output and planning outcome) that shape the urban
patterns and the planning process at the observable level. As a tunnel connecting the invis-
ible societal environment to the visible planning artefacts, the planning environment can
be both manifest (in terms of actors’ decision-making behaviour) and non-manifest (in
terms of actors’ values).
Since we operationalize planning culture as shared values and attitudes among actors,
we aim to measure the values and attitudes of planning actors. Particularly, we choose risk,
trust and co-operative attitudes as variables in the measurement of the concept of planning
culture. First, the three attitudes are of great importance to (interactive) planning
decisions. Planning actors from diﬀerent cultures may (in a more general way) value
risk, trust and co-operation diﬀerently. The value diﬀerences, in turn, lead to diﬀerent atti-
tudes in some speciﬁc situations: for instance, whether to invest in high-risk but high-
reward development projects, how much to invest in monitoring business partners and
agents, and whether to co-operate or act alone when the relative beneﬁts are uncertain.
Second, these variables have been extensively studied in economics experiments (see,
for instance, Holt and Laury (2002) for risk; Ostrom and Walker (2003) for trust; and
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) for co-operation). The established experimental
methods, which are explained in detail in section 3, provide good tools to measure
those variables. Last but not least, the three attitudes have also been compared in
diﬀerent countries and in diﬀerent subject groups (Chuah et al., 2009). Existing compara-
tive data may provide a good basis for validating our results. We acknowledge that there
are other important cultural values manifesting in actor interaction, for instance
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consensus-oriented vs outcome-oriented, person-oriented vs task-oriented, etc (Fürst,
2009, p. 26; Othengrafen, 2014). While these are also important and interesting indicators,
they are hard to measure and thus lacking comparable evidence.
3. Methodology
In order to elicit planning and urban development professionals’ attitudes towards risk,
trust and co-operation, we have designed an experiment based on experimental practices
in economics and earlier applications of these practices in planning research (Glumac,
Han, Schaefer, & Van der Krabben, 2015; Samsura, 2013; Samsura, Van der Krabben,
Van Deemen, & Van der Heijden, 2015). We also selected professionals working for
either municipalities or commercial development and consultancy companies as the sta-
keholders in planning and property development processes. The experiment is therefore
contextualized based on common planning and land development issues faced by muni-
cipalities and commercial developers in the three countries. This contributes to the exter-
nal validity of the experiment.
The experiment consists of three games associated to the three variables, namely risk,
trust, and co-operative attitudes. After each game, participants were asked to ﬁll in a short
survey related to the topic and their socio-demographic characteristics. The experimental
instructions were ﬁrst formulated in English and then translated to the subjects’ national
languages: French,4 Dutch and Norwegian.
All games are one-shot games,5 which means that participants make the same decision
only once. Although most experimental economic games are ﬁnancially incentivized, we
didn’t follow this principle. Since our goal is to elicit only the professional preferences of
practitioners, we decided not to provide monetary incentives, which may induce personal
monetary preference. Besides we assured double-blind anonymity so neither exper-
imenters nor peer participants would track answers from any participants to their identity.
3.1 Design of the experiment
First, to elicit risk attitudes, we built a game based on the one-player Bomb Risk Elicitation
Task (BRET) (Crosetto & Filippin, 2013). BRET is an established risk elicitation tool in
experimental economics. We use it to elicit risk attitudes under a type of primary uncer-
tainties in development: uncertainty in location conditions.
In our version of BRET, each participant chooses how many plots of land to buy and
develop from a grid of 25 plots. They earn a proﬁt of 20 points per plot. However, one
unknown plot out of the 25 is contaminated. We assume that the clean-up fee of the con-
taminated plot is big enough to nullify all the potential earnings from development. If the
contaminated plot is one of those chosen by the participant, (s)he will get zero; otherwise,
her/his earnings equal the number of the plots (s)he buys multiplied by 20 points. Partici-
pants thus face the trade-oﬀ between a number of points they can earn and the likelihood
of obtaining them. Since the expected utility maximizing amount is in the middle of the
choice range (12.5), a risk-neutral subject should choose 12 or 13 plots to buy. The
more plots they buy, the more risk-loving they are and vice versa. Figure 2 illustrates
the game.
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Second, to elicit trust attitudes, we follow the traditional design by Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe (1995): a two-player sequential game to measure trust and reciprocity. Both
players get 100 points at the start of the game. The ﬁrst player (the sender) can decide
to give some of the 100 points to the receiver. The sent amount (S) is multiplied by
3. The receiver then decides from the tripled amount (s)he gets (3S), how much (s)he
would like to return (R) to the sender. At the end of the game, the sender gets 100-S+R
and the receiver gets 100+3S-R as illustrated in Figure 3. Given fully rational players
who are driven by utility maximization, the theoretical prediction of this game is that R
will be zero as the receiver has no incentive to return anything to the sender. If the
sender predicts this, S is also zero. The sent amount S indicates how much trust the
sender places in the receiver and the return amount R indicates how much reciprocity
the receiver repays to the sender for her/his trust. Reciprocity is a key facilitator of trust
Figure 2. An illustration of BRET.
Figure 3. An illustration of trust game.
8 K. LI ET AL.
but not in itself important for us. We, therefore, let all players be in the sending position
and told them they are playing against a hypothetical private developer or public planner.
In order to measure whether the trust attitudes towards diﬀerent partners vary between
public and private actors, we designed four treatment groups: Public vs Private (MP),
Public vs Public (MM), Private vs Private (PP), and Private vs Public (PM). The treatment
groups MP and MM were played with pubic participants who are representing municipal
planners (M), while PP and PM were played with private participants who represent
private developers (P).
Last, to elicit co-operative attitudes, we use Ledyard’s (1995) public goods game in a
development context. Three players play as independent developers in a neighbourhood.
Each developer gets an endowment of 100 points. They choose how much to invest in a
neighbourhood improvement project independently (S1,S2,S3). The total investment is
doubled and then shared evenly by the developers. For each player, the earnings equal
to a third of the doubled total investment plus whatever (s)he kept. Because the marginal
per capita return from the public goods is lower than 1, no matter what the other players
do, the best strategy for any fully rational player is to contribute nothing. The group as a
whole would, however, be best oﬀ if all invest 100 points. The investment amount of
players indicates their propensity for co-operation. This game is illustrated in Figure 4.
Like in the trust game, in order to measure whether the co-operative attitudes of munici-
pal planners (M) and private developers (P) are diﬀerent towards diﬀerent partners, we
designed four treatment groups: MPP, MMM, PPP and PPM. The participants were told
that they are playing with two other hypothetical private and/or public participants.
3.2 Participants and procedure
The experiments were conducted in the three countries from June 2016 to June 2017. We
used two venues of gathering subjects. First, we contacted approximately 8,500 persons by
Figure 4. An illustration of public goods game.
EUROPEAN PLANNING STUDIES 9
emails through professional networks, in which 298 (3.5%) responded and 244 (2.9%)
completed the session. We also followed up about 100 emails with phone calls to
members of the less populated cohorts (the municipal planners or the private developers
depending on the countries). Second, we invited the participants of four planning and
development conferences to participate as part of the events, which yielded 195 respon-
dents out of 277 attendees (70%). The participants who were reached through emails
played the games on Qualtrics, Google Forms or GXP,6 while the conference participants
played online on SurveyMonkey or used physical handouts. The participants were
instructed not to communicate with each other during the experiment.
4. Results
4.1 Risk game – Bomb risk elicitation task (BRET)
This game elicits the risk attitudes of players by providing them with a trade-oﬀ between
maximizing proﬁts and minimizing risks, with the risk-seeking players taking more than
13 plots. Table 2 shows the results of our BRET game.
Nonparametric tests results7 (not presented here, but available from the authors upon
request) show that Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian participants can all be categorized as
risk-averse on average. Dutch participants are most risk-averse, followed by Belgians
and lastly Norwegians. Cross-country diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. In terms of pairwise com-
parisons, Norwegian participants are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Belgian and Dutch par-
ticipants, while diﬀerences between Belgian and Dutch participants are not signiﬁcant.
Previous cultural studies have shown that Belgians have a much stronger preference for
uncertainty avoidance than Dutch and Norwegians (Hofstede, 2001, p. 151). Our results
partially verify this for private actors, while only the high risk aversion of Dutch public
professionals contradicts it. Since Dutch municipalities have invested heavily in the
land market for decades but suﬀered great losses in the 2008 ﬁnancial and economic
crisis, Dutch municipal planners’ present risk aversion can, therefore, be interpreted as
a ‘response’ to these losses (Van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013).
Regarding public-private diﬀerences, public and private participants in both Norway
and Belgium show no diﬀerence in risk attitudes, while public participants in the Nether-
lands are signiﬁcantly more risk-averse than their private counterparts. Therefore only our
Dutch data demonstrate Klijn and Teisman (2003)’s arguments that public professionals
Table 2. Levels of risk attitudes in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway.
Country N Mean
Type classiﬁcation (%)
Averse Neutral Loving
Belgium 79 10.14 61 19 20
Public 25 10.20 60 16 24
Private 54 10.11 61 20 19
The Netherlands 74 8.91 73 14 14
Public 43 7.84 84 2 14
Private 31 10.39 58 29 13
Norway 90 11.99 41 24 34
Public 50 12.30 38 28 34
Private 40 11.60 45 20 35
TOTAL 243 10.45
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value risk avoidance more than private professionals. As mentioned, this diﬀerence might
be intensiﬁed by the impact of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis on the budgets of the Dutch
municipalities.
4.2 Trust game
Table 3 presents trust levels among our subjects. It shows that Dutch and Norwegian par-
ticipants exhibit more trust than Belgian participants. Overall, it demonstrates that trust
among planning actors is not high.8
Our cross-country data is consistent with the ﬁndings from several large, inﬂuential
value surveys among the general population. For instance, the European Values Study
20089 shows that 62% of Dutch and 75% of Norwegian participants think most people
can be trusted, while only 27% of French-speaking Belgian think the same. For the
whole of Belgium, the percentage is 35%. It is also consistent with the European Social
Survey 2014,10 which uses the same question but has numeric value: general trust in
Norway (6.62) and Netherlands (5.97) is above an European average (5.21), while trust
level in Belgium (5.02) is below average.
The Dutch and Norwegian MP results are also consistent with Sager (2009): Norwegian
planners are less in favour of private developers than Dutch planners. However, the Dutch
and Belgian PM results do not support the observations that there is a fundamental dis-
trust to planning in Belgium and a general trust to planning in the Netherlands (De Vries,
2015; Faludi, 2005).
When we take a closer look at public-private diﬀerences, we ﬁnd that Dutch public par-
ticipants trust more than Dutch private participants. In contrast, Norwegian public par-
ticipants trust less than Norwegian private participants, while Belgian participants show
no diﬀerence in trust levels. The Dutch results conﬁrm the ﬁndings from Public-Private
Partnerships in Dutch urban development projects in which both public and private
actors hold bias and distrust towards one another (Heurkens, 2012, p. 32). This corre-
sponds to the common ﬁnding that people tend to be more trusting towards people
from their own group (Tanis & Postmes, 2005).
In clear contrast, the Belgian results show the opposite: both public-public and private-
private trust are lower than trust in the mixed group, of which private-private trust scored
the lowest of all treatment groups. This may be the result of the group composition.
Table 3. Levels of trust attitudes in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway.
Country N Mean
Treatment groups (M = Municipality; P = Property
developer)
MM MP PP PM
Belgium 71 42
Public 27 (14, 13) 43 40 46 – –
Private 44 (23, 21) 42 – – 37 48
The Netherlands 47 52
Public 30 (15, 15) 54 61 47 – –
Private 17 (9, 8) 49 – – 51 46
Norway 140 51
Public 42 (22, 20) 46 49 43 – –
Private 98 (53, 45) 53 – – 51 55
Note: Detailed treatment group size is shown in parentheses.
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Indeed, in the survey that we made after the trust game, we have noticed that the partici-
pants in the PP group are found more trusting in other people. We, therefore, attribute the
unexpected low PP trust to a statistical anomaly due to our small sample size. Besides,
trends in Norwegian results reveal private actors’ trust towards public actors. This
reﬂects the ﬁndings of the European Social Survey (2014) regarding trust in the general
population and towards the bureaucracy.
When we compare the treatment group of MM in three countries, we can see that
public participants in the Netherlands trust their partners from the same sector much
more than those in Belgium and Norway. In all three countries public participants
show low trust towards partners from the private sector. When we compare PP
numbers, private participants in Belgium show the least trust. Lastly, private participants’
trust in Norway towards a public partner is higher than the same group for the Nether-
lands and Belgium.
4.3 Public goods game
Based on the results of our public good game as shown in Table 4, we ﬁnd that participants
in all three countries are more co-operative than the average found in economic exper-
iments, where roughly 50% of endowments are contributed in one-shot games (Levitt &
List, 2007). Norwegian participants are even more co-operative than the Dutch and
Belgian participants.
Taking a closer look at public-private diﬀerences, we ﬁnd that Dutch public participants
contribute more than Dutch private participants, whereas the Norwegian and Belgian
public and private participants show no diﬀerence in average contributions. When we
compare treatment groups of MMM in three countries, we can see that public participants
in all countries show similarly high levels of co-operation with other public partners. This
may serve as supporting evidence to a widespread inter-municipal co-operation phenom-
enon throughout Europe (including the Netherlands and Belgium), as discussed in Hulst
and Van Montfort (2012).
In the case of MPP, the level of co-operation slightly declines: Belgian and Norwegian
public participants show lower co-operative attitudes towards private partners, but Dutch
public participants co-operate the same when we tell them they play with private partners.
This corresponds to the statement by Halleux et al. (2012) who argue that Belgian
Table 4. Levels of co-operative attitudes in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway.
Country N Mean
Treatment groups (M = Municipality; P = Property
developer)
MMM MPP PPP PPM
Belgium 41 54
Public 16 (8, 8) 55 59 51 – –
Private 35 (15, 20) 54 – – 48 62
The Netherlands 39 57
Public 25 (13, 12) 61 61 61 – –
Private 14 (8, 6) 50 – – 55 43
Norway 236 61
Public 93 (81, 12) 61 62 55 – –
Private 143 (98, 45) 61 – – 62 60
Note: Detailed treatment group size is shown in parentheses.
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municipalities are much more reluctant than their Dutch peers to co-operate with private
developers. Meanwhile, since Norwegian planners are more in disfavour of private devel-
opers than Dutch planners (Sager, 2009), it also makes sense that their co-operative atti-
tudes towards developers are lower than those of their Dutch peers.
When we compare PPP groups, private participants in Norway show the highest level
of co-operation with private partners, and Belgians the lowest. In PPM groups, Dutch
private participants tend to co-operate less when they interact with public partners
(lowest overall). Belgian private participants tend to co-operate more in this treatment
group than any other.
Lastly, as trust and cooperation are two focal and mutually reinforcing elements in
planning (Kumar & Paddison, 2000) as well as in general social science (Gächter, Herr-
mann, & Thöni, 2004; Ostrom & Walker, 2003), we also tested the correlation between
trust and cooperation in the Dutch and Norwegian data.11 The results show that they
are positively correlated (p < 0.01). This indicates the importance of trust in planning as
‘trust functions as an assumption and as a developer of co-operation (the more trustful
behaviour is, the more intensive co-operation is possible)’ (CULTPLAN, 2007).
In summary, our experimental results reveal the attitudinal diﬀerences in decision-
making in planning between the three countries as well as between public and private
actors in each country. The highlights of our ﬁndings are summarized in Table 5.
5. Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is to oﬀer experimental games as a measurement tool
(as a complement to CPM as an analytical tool) of planning culture. We have operationa-
lized and measured planning culture through three attitudes. In this section, we will look
critically at the internal and external validity of our experimental results and discuss the
appropriateness of the operationalization.
5.1 Measurement: internal and external validity of the experiment
Experimental studies are commonly evaluated by two criteria: internal and external val-
idity. First, internal validity refers to the reliability of the causal relationship established
in the experiment between independent and dependent variables. In our experiment,
the independent variables are country and sector, while the dependent variables are
risk, trust and co-operative attitudes. The internal validity issue relates to the confounding
threat which suggests that a third variable may explain the relationship between an inde-
pendent and dependent variable. In the context of our experiment, the potential impact of
socio-demographic variables such as income, age, gender, working experience, or size of
employment organization may raise concerns. Due to the limited size of our three national
samples, the data were not rich enough to run robust statistical analysis to test the poten-
tial impact of socio-demographic variables. However, Van derWal, De Graaf, and Lasthui-
zen (2008) ﬁnd that value preferences are primarily attached to the sector (public vs
private) rather than other socio-demographic characteristics, based on a related survey
with a larger number of professionals from public and private sector organizations.
In terms of internal validity, another methodological issue relates to the professional
implication of some of the respondents. This problem was put forward by the fact that,
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in the risk game, some participants chose 0 or 25 plots to buy, which results in an auto-
matic payoﬀ of zero! Thanks to the short survey the participants had to ﬁll in after the
game, we realized that this type of answer was not caused by a misunderstanding of the
game but, instead, by a professional judgement. Indeed, some of the public participants
who chose 25 justiﬁed their choices with the arguments that the municipality does not
aim for ﬁnancial proﬁts and that addressing soil contamination is a public task. In parallel,
some of the private participants who chose 0 explained their motivations by the fact that
they consider the transfer of risk from seller to buyer as unreasonable. In relation to this
point, it must be noted that the answers of 0 and 25 plots were not considered in the quan-
titative analyses.
Second, a common critique of an experimental approach is its limited generalizability
(external validity). In this respect, we shall discuss whether our sample is representative of
Table 5. Highlights of risk, trust and co-operative attitudes in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway.
Country Diﬀerences Risk attitudes Trust attitudes Co-operative attitudes
Belgium (BE) Cross-
country
. Medium risk-averse
. Diﬀerence between BE and NL
is not signiﬁcant
. BE public is medium risk-averse,
but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from NO public
. BE private is most risk-averse,
but not signiﬁcantly
. Least trust
. MM: lowest
. MP: similar to NL
and higher than
NO
. PP: lowest of
overall
. PM: medium
. Least co-operative
. MMM: similarly high
level of co-operation
. MPP: lowest
. PPP: lowest
. PPM: highest of overall
and similar to NO
Public-
private
. Public is less risk-averse than
private, but not signiﬁcantly
. Very similar in risk categories
. No public-
private
diﬀerence
. MM<MP
. PP < PM
. No public-private
diﬀerence
. MMM>MPP
. PPP < PPM
The
Netherlands
(NL)
Cross-
country
. Most risk-averse
. Diﬀerence between NL and BE
is not signiﬁcant
. NL public is signiﬁcantly more
risk-averse than BE and NO
public
. NL private is medium risk-
averse, but not signiﬁcantly
. More trusting
than BE and
similar to NO
. MM: highest of
overall
. MP: similar to BE
and higher than
NO
. PP: highest and
similar to NO
. PM: lowest
. Medium co-operative
. MMM: similarly high
level of co-operation
. MPP: highest
. PPP: medium
. PPM: lowest of overall
Public-
private
. Public is signiﬁcantly more risk-
averse than private
. Public show
higher trust
than private
. MM>MP
. PP > PM
. MP = PM
. Public co-operate more
than private
. MMM=MPP
. PPP > PPM
Norway (NO) Cross-
country
. Least risk-averse
. Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from BE
and NL
. NO public is least risk-averse,
but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from BE public
. NO private is least risk-averse,
but not signiﬁcantly
. More trusting
than BE and
similar to NL
. MM: medium
. MP: lowest
. PP: highest and
similar to NL
. PM: highest
. Most co-operative
. MMM: similarly high
level of co-operation,
highest of overall
. MPP: medium
. PPP: highest of overall
. PPM: highest and
similar to BE
Public-
private
. Public is less risk-averse than
private, but not signiﬁcantly
. Public show
lower trust than
private
. MM>MP
. PP < PM
. No public-private
diﬀerence
. MMM>MPP
. PPP > PPM
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the three considered planning environments. To do so, we discuss below the issue of the
sampling bias and the issue of the abstract versus planning-relevant context.
Unlike most experimental economic games which recruit student subjects, this exper-
iment was conducted with planning and development practitioners. We do this to ensure
the generalizability of our results to planning actors. Though our sample size is relatively
low, we have tried to reach participants through many channels. Based on the available
demographic data, we regard the representativeness of our three national samples as
acceptable. However, the ultimate test of an experiment’s external validity is replication.
The most signiﬁcant alteration we made compared to the typical economics exper-
iments is that we frame the context with common planning-relevant issues in the three
countries. Deviating from the often abstract framing in economics, our experiment inten-
tionally provides a familiar context for our participants, as endorsed by Loewenstein
(1999). We asked the participants to reﬂect upon their professional roles as much as poss-
ible. On the one hand, since we frame hypothetical settings without explicit wordings like
risk, trust and co-operation, it reduces some self-reporting bias found in common survey
research. We are conﬁdent that participants reveal their honest inclinations. On the other
hand, to ensure coherence and comparability, we keep the game instructions as close as
possible to the original, abstract games. It is possible that some subjects misunderstood
our instructions. However, a richer context may hamper the control of experiment as sub-
jects may make decisions as a response to factors that are not intended by experimenters
(Levitt & List, 2007). The balance between rich and abstract context is a challenge to any
planning experiments.
5.2 Operationalization of planning culture
Our measurement of planning culture is based on how we operationalize the concept. The
CPM-based conceptual framework provides the basis for measuring planning cultures.
The framework attempts to complement the CPM’s explanatory power at the micro
level by arguing that planning actors’ behaviour in interactions can be explained by
their values and attitudes. This is in line with the arguments in Reimer and Blotevogel
(2012) that planning cultures are established through concrete forms of planning
action, which are the consequence of the speciﬁc values and orientations of the actors
involved. Here we discuss risk, trust and co-operative attitudes of actors involved in plan-
ning and development as operational variables of planning culture.
Firstly, we have used attitudes to infer values. It can be summarized from Table 5 that
Dutch planning actors value risk aversion and trust; Norwegian planning actors value co-
operation; while Belgian planning actors have a lower score of these values when com-
pared to the other countries. This empirical evidence is largely in line with observations
and discourses of national cultures in the three countries. We could, therefore, state
that as ‘culture manifests itself in values’ (Hofstede, 2001, p. 10) and ‘values are among
the building blocks of culture’ (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25), there is also a similar relationship
between planning culture and values of risk, trust and co-operation.
Nevertheless, it seems rather speculative to conﬁrm this statement. One reason is that
‘both the formal rules and the informal constraints are embodied in attitudes and values’
(North, 1990, p. 136). It would be arbitrary to attribute attitudinal diﬀerences to simply
cultural diﬀerences, without taking into account formal institutional inﬂuences.
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Although we have controlled that all participants read the same instructions and there-
fore all diﬀerences are due to intrinsic diﬀerences in their mind-sets, it is beyond this
research to investigate why and how actors in three countries have formed diﬀerent atti-
tudes. The planning systems in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway vary in what pro-
minence market actors have in planning implementation and in implementing power
held by the public. These diﬀerences most likely inﬂuence actors’ experiences and atti-
tudes in the public – market interaction. It is however not our task to explain the diﬀer-
ences. We have, however, successfully measured planning culture as it is narrowly
deﬁned here, and provided numerical data for actors’ diﬀerent attitudes in planning
interactions.
Secondly and by acknowledging the previous limitation, based on the empirical evi-
dence, we move a small step forward towards the understanding of the planning environ-
ment identiﬁed in the culturized planning model. The approach taken has shown a direct
impact of culture on values and attitudes of planning actors across countries and between
sectors. With our experiment, we capture the attitudinal part of planning culture to some
extent. However, we also admit that the whole spectrum of planning culture is too rich to
be fully captured. To maintain the focus of measurement, other elements within planning
environment as well as factors in societal environments and planning artefacts have been
omitted. Therefore we reiterate that improving the explanatory power of the concept is not
what we aim for. With the help of the conceptual framework, future studies on planning
actions and planning practices can build on our attitudinal results to ﬁnd explanations for
planning behaviours. This is also a response to call for more studies on behavioural aspects
of actors in planning (Othengrafen, 2014; Reimer & Blotevogel, 2012; Samsura, Van der
Krabben, & Van Deemen, 2010).
6. Conclusion
This research started from a curiosity to understand how culture impacts planning. As
a response to a bunch of literature criticizing the vague comparisons of planning cul-
tures, we borrowed economic experimental games to measure planning culture. Our
study demonstrates how planning culture can be measured and compared systemati-
cally through risk, trust and co-operative attitudes. With the help of the comparability
and replicability advantages entailed in experimental games (Camerer & Fehr, 2004),
this paper contributes to the debate with introducing this systematic measurement
tool (Croson & Gächter, 2010), veriﬁed by empirical evidence from three European
countries.
We are aware that our results involve limitations, mainly focused on experimental prac-
ticalities. The samples were small and uneven. Moreover, it should be noted that in this
research we mainly focus on measuring planning actors’ attitudes towards risk, trust
and co-operation as a bridge between planning culture and planning outcome by using
experiment as a tool. We have not discussed other important elements of culture, for
instance norms and traditions. However, based on the empirical evidence collected in
Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, we have demonstrated that planning culture can
be measured and compared by testing carefully selected variables in an experiment. The
experiment can be replicated in more countries and statistical analyses can be carried
out with larger sample sizes. It is also meaningful to repeat the experiment in a later
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period to track changes in planning culture over time or after a critical event. We hope that
these results can trigger more debates on the relationship between planning culture and
planning outcome.
As a ﬁnal point, two main reﬂections can be drawn from our study to prepare a future
research agenda. Firstly, it will be interesting to see whether the measured preferences of
Dutch municipal planners for the avoidance of uncertainty will persist even when the land
and property markets remain stable for a long period of time (as is more or less the situ-
ation since 2014). Secondly, the breakdown of results between French-speaking Belgium,
on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Norway, on the other hand, may invite comp-
lementary investigations in other countries. Those investigations should be designed to
evaluate whether collaborative planning practices are feasible within a low-trust society.
It would also be interesting to explore the relations between these cultural factors and
the legal and administrative planning families identiﬁed in (Newman & Thornley,
1996), as a complement to discussions about formal and informal logics of planning
action (Reimer & Blotevogel, 2012).
Notes
1. Please note that our meaning of operationalization is in line with the traditional understand-
ing of operationalization which is the process of strictly deﬁning variables into measurable
factors. This process is driven by our aim to make planning cultures measurable. In contrast,
this approach diﬀers from other operational studies in comparative planning cultures (e.g.
Getimis, 2012) which focus on comparability of planning cultures.
2. We admit that there are other kinds of planning actors for instance landowners, investors,
politicians, etc. For the sake of testing the experimental approach, we focus on the most
representative subject groups in public and private sectors.
3. The selection of the three countries is in fact based on practical reason in which the authors
are all involved in a research project due to their shared research interests. Nevertheless, the
fact that these countries actually also have diﬀerent planning systems (see e.g. Dubois,
Gabriel, Halleux, & Michel, 2002 for BE, Needham, 2016 for NL, and Falleth & Nordahl,
2017 for NO) and that they are somewhat moderately close with each other in terms of
culture (as European countries), has made the comparison interesting and more reasonable.
4. The games were played by French-speaking subjects from Brussels and Wallonia. Our results
therefore do not speak of the reality for the Dutch-speaking population of Belgium.
5. Compared to repeated games that test learning eﬀects, one-shot games are used to elicit sub-
jects’ intrinsic motivations in making decisions. This is a common approach in social prefer-
ence experiments to exclude strategic motivations like reputation building in repeated games
(Levitt & List, 2007).
6. GXP (https://gxpfoundation.wordpress.com/) is an online experimental platform that sup-
ports research in human behaviour. Experimental sessions on GXP are programmed in
Otree (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016; Holzmeister & Pfurtscheller, 2016).
7. We speciﬁcally used the Mann-Whitney U Test. We used the non-parametric test to compare
diﬀerences between independent groups because we do not make any assumption about the
distribution of the data.
8. Based on the average sent amount found in economics experiments which is roughly 50% of
the endowment (Levitt & List, 2007).
9. https://www.gesis.org/en/services/data-analysis/international-survey-programs/european-
values-study/.
10. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/.
11. This test could not be done for Belgium as the two games were played by diﬀerent subjects.
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